Forthcoming in
Introduction

"Professional immigration is […] a tool for growth. […] We find ourselves in a reasoning of international football where the big teams recruit in the entire
century. Recent studies contend that logics of competitiveness, innovation, and economic growth through foreign labour reproduction shape the emerging labour migration regimes in Europe (Menz 2009 , Menz et al. 2010a ). This contextualises labour migration policy in wider state transformation processes captured in 'competition state' theory (mainly : Cerny 1997 , Cerny et al. 2000 . According to these authors, nation states respond to globalisation processes mainly with a pro-active facilitation of economic growth and competitiveness.
Is labour migration policy (LMP) yet another expression of the 'competition state' then and if so, in what ways and to what extent? This article analyses LMP through a cultural political economy lens (Jessop 2008 , Jessop et al. 2006 ) to evaluate the extent to which policies can be explained with competition state theory. The cultural political economy perspective offers so far lacking insights in the selective semiotic embedding of LMP in capitalist economies, thereby illuminating the strategic use of competitiveness logics, but also the lack thereof, in a multi-tiered economic governance of labour migration. Based on macro-economic and political significance, the paper uses examples from France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) which have featured as the top three destinations for migrant workers in Europe for some decades now (OECD 2009) , and have revitalised recruitment schemes at roughly the same time, with Britain being a slight forerunner. By concentrating on common tendencies in LMP across these major European capitalist economies ii the paper 1) stimulates a discussion about the emergence of shared organisational principles in European capitalism and 2) the role of labour migration in this process. The analysis concentrates on policies on so-called third country nationals (TCN), i.e. migrant workers from extra-EU countries. This does not seek to downgrade the importance of EU-internal work movements and the impact of EU-level policy on state regulation. To the contrary: the analysis reveals that EU free movement creates a versatile spatial reference point for TCN admissions.
The article firstly introduces theoretical foundations in political economy with a particular commitment to cultural political economy (CPE) as so far developed by Bob
Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum. To contest the extent to which idealtypical competition state logics inform LMP, I utilise the analytical device of economic imaginaries -understood here as highly selective semiotic systems that accentuate specific aspects of the socioeconomic world to frame policies (Jessop 2009) . By means of interpretive policy analysis this article examines 1) legal classifications of migrant workers based on analysis of 30 odd legal documents, and 2) the meanings of legal classifications based on interviews with 25 high-ranking policy-makers in two empirical sections (list of documents and interviews in appendix). I thus identify the economic imaginaries that underpin LMP and assess resonances of competition state theory.
The analysis exposes three distinct economic imaginaries which shape LMP: highskilled global labour competiveness, skilled national labour shortages, and lower skilled EU labour self-sufficiency. These form different realms of economic governance which dictate diverse skill foci, policy drivers, spatial reference points, and modi operandi in LMP. In this fragmented cultural political economy of labour migration, only the first imaginary fully embraces competition state logics, while competing state projects gain prominence in the others. Not only is the resonance of competition state logics deliberately limited to the realm of high-skilled recruitment in a multi-tiered LMP. I moreover argue that this splitting-up of policies by skill level -and the associated selective amplification or silencing of economic competitiveness logics -enables capitalist states to resolve tensions between co-existing state projects vis-à-vis labour migration. These findings require us to redefine the scope and locus of the competition state in LMP, to acknowledge and theorise empirical fragmentations in statutory economic governance processes, and to sharpen our conceptual grasp of the political ordering of social and economic relations at the heart of all policy-making more generally.
Labour migration in competition states? A cultural political economy lens
The return to active foreign labour recruitment since the late 1990s in Europe -after the official suspension of post-war guest workers schemes following the 1970s oil crisis and subsequent economic recession -has triggered increasing academic attention. Manifold are the accounts of the economic and demographic 'pressures' that lead governments across Europe to once again support labour imports in their policy-making (e.g. Castles 2006 , Menz 2009 , Menz et al. 2010b , Ruhs et al. 2010 . The political economy of foreign labour recruitment is on the verge of becoming a field of social scientific inquiry in its own right, with scholars predicting recruitment to remain resilient even in the current economic crisis (Castles 2011) and larger comparative research projects taking off (Pastore 2011) . At the heart of these revived inquiries we often find the assumption that labour migration is yet 'another tool for growth'. To take account of the basic parameters of this argument, this conceptual section firstly briefly depicts policy changes in France, Germany and the UK and their rhetorical bond to economic utility considerations. It then engages with the theoretical arguments around 'competition state' implied in this bond, problematises the limits of these arguments, and operationalises a CPE perspective to examine their relevance empirically.
Economic utility in labour migration policy: articulation of competition states?
Economic utility rhetoric accompanied the rebirth of foreign labour recruitment.
Germany's 2001 introduction of a 'Green Card' for IT workers forged a response to labour shortages in a specific field. A new Migration Law followed in 2005, and was underpinned by the assumption that the national economy "had to attract highly skilled immigrants to remain economically competitive" (Green 2007, p. 112) . At roughly the same time, The rediscovery of migrant workers as "potentially useful human resources" bears a strong notion of economic utility in all three cases: "Migrants are welcome as long as they promise to contribute to the prerogatives of a business-friendly national economic growth strategy" (Menz 2009, p. 31 (Cerny et al. 2000; Evans et al. 2010) . They depict a changing role of state policy towards "the promotion of economic activities, whether at home or abroad, which will make firms and sectors located within the territory of the state competitive in international markets" (Cerny 1997, p. 272) . A domestic 'raison d'état' embodied in the production of national welfare, social solidarity and justice has given way to a 'raison du
Monde' which embraces the logics of economic association and international capitalist competition (Cerny 2010) . Though born as an empirical-analytical concept capturing specific macro-economic trajectories in specific cases, the competition state heuristic is applied here for its quality as idealtypical benchmark of statutory economic coordination processes (for genealogy of and ongoing confusion over the concept see Evans et al. 2010) .
Competition state theory emerged in the context of neo-liberal reform agendas in AngloAmerican politics in the 1990s. The UK might serve as prime example of a competition state shift over the past three decades (Evans 2010) , but also France and Germany are believed to "have moved more incrementally towards the competition state model" in the 2000s, with the European Union as an important "driving force" at their back (Evans et al. 2010, p. 2 (Boswell et al. 2011 , Carmel 2011 , Hansen et al. 2010 , Kaiser et al. 2011 
Semiosis and political ordering: a cultural political economy approach
How can we achieve a more fine-grained analysis of LMP to assess the extent to which this policy area is dominated by competition state logics? I propose an interpretive policy analysis with specific focus on the selective political ordering processes involved in policymaking. The study dedicates its analytical heart to the substance of public policy governance and its multiple normative inscriptions, dictating a strong methodological commitment to the interpretive turn in policy analysis (e.g. Yanow 2006 ). This takes Fischer's (2003) critique of 'conventional' policy analysis seriously, which castigated the emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency of policy-making at the expense of capturing the underlying values, ideas and the contested character of policies as political ordering attempts.
Interpretive policy analysts more generally suggest that "the effort to exclude meaning and values from the work of the policy analyst cuts the very heart out of political inquiry" (Fischer 2003, p. 216 ; also see: Gottweis 2003 , Hajer et al. 2003 , Yanow 2000 Jessop (2008 Jessop ( , 2009 ) and together with Sum (2006) so far, has two major advantages for the analytical purposes of this article:
• it helps exposing the strategic momentum of meaning-making in policy with its emphasis on selective framing and normative presumptions of policies;
• it is particularly interested in economic formations and governance processes and hence offers a useful analytical toolbox and vocabulary for a study of labour migration vis-à-vis competition and innovation state logics.
CPE provides an explanatory approach with a role for semiosis beyond relativism.
This cutting-edge work rejects the notion of infinite interpretations, acknowledges the powerful role of privileged actors such as policy-makers to structure meaning-making processes, and offers an analytical entry point to expose why certain economic formations and interpretations are selected and become powerful. CPE suggests that the emergence of certain normative reference points and tools for economic coordination can be explained in terms of their strategic variation, selection and retention (e.g. Jessop 2009 ). This concurs with authors who highlighted the constant, and strategically selective, creation of 'governable terrains' (Carmel et al. 2008) and 'governable objects' in public policy (Gottweis 2003) . Policy-making is hence understood here as an attempt of political ordering which engages with competing interpretations and structural sedimentations in a given policy field -labour migration in our case -, which selects and imposes specific semiotic orders, and ultimately structures subject positions of those governed through the policy.
In migration policy, legislation imposes a range of selective symbolic orders: it draws on different economic, social and political assumptions to distinguish between 'legal' and 'illegal' residents and workers; it paints many different shades of 'legality' in a plethora of permits and statuses; and it imposes highly selective borders to labour markets, welfare states, and political citizenship (more in Paul 2011a). The assertion here is that policy meanings -as imposed in state legislation -might be multiple, but they are not infinite. They display selective linkages to specific parts of the economy, labour market, welfare state etc. While policy meanings might be contested and unfinished, the political ordering implied in selective semiotic structuration through policies turns labour migrants into objects of governance and strongly shapes their experiences in host countries.
CPE has so far not been applied in LMP analyses, giving this article an opportunity of both elaborating the perspective analytically and showcasing its usefulness for comprehending foreign labour recruitment policies in twenty-first century Europe. Jessop specifies entry points for an analysis in reference to economic imaginaries. He argues that a CPE approach:
"highlights the role of discursively-selective institutions in the making of economic practices and, a fortiori, economic policies. Imaginaries are semiotic systems that frame individual subjects' lived experiences of an inordinately complex world and/or inform collective calculation about that world. [...] They identify, privilege, and seek to stabilize some economic activities from the totality of economic relations and transform them into objects of [...] governance." (Jessop 2009, p. 344) The interpretive stance and CPE lens inform the research strategy of the article. By identifying the economic imaginaries of labour migration dominant in policy-making, it scrutinises a) the meanings and roles policy ascribes to labour migration and migrant workers, b) the selective character of these normative inscriptions, and c) the strategic and selective contextualisation of LMP in competing symbolic orders within the wider socioeconomic formation. If Menz' account of LMP is correct, we would have to expect a dominance of an economic imaginary that exhibits logics of competitiveness and innovation across French, German and British labour recruitment policies. However, the problematisation of competition state theory anticipates limits to these logics in a more fragmented socio-economic formation empirically.
Utility is not (always) enough: legal classifications of migrant workers
In historical perspective, labour migration is a prime example of a selective re- by labour scarcity and selection by skill level with highly differential effects on migrant workers' rights. Country of origin also figures important and will be considered later in this section.
Utilitarianism by default: selecting by labour scarcity
The legal emphasis on labour scarcity highlights a hardly surprising utilitarian policy design of labour admissions. By default policies target economically useful foreign workers. More precisely, all migrants need a valid job offer when they apply for entry clearance as a worker. Public authorities then use this job offer in two ways to establish labour scarcity. The applicant can pass a resident labour market test (RLMT) for the offered position. In this case, the RLMT checks the availability of domestic, resident or EU workers before admitting a third country national into a specific job in a specific labour market district. This establishes a principle of preference of the mentioned groups of workers over newcomers and thus addresses employment protection goals. Alternatively, the job and migrant skill profile have to match a shortage list defined by employment agencies and special advisory bodies. Non-availability of otherwise preferred workers is taken for granted due to longer-term labour market observation. In both scenarios, the utility of a migrant based on scarcity of their skills profile determines entry options.
This utilitarian logic is maintained throughout the initial residence period: work permits are usually valid for a specific job only and each change of position and/or employer has to be approved by the relevant Home Office or Labour Ministry agencies.
Utilitarian selectivity at entry hence precedes a utilitarian delineation of residency and settlement paths, at least until a change of status provides a more decommodified status (e.g. to long-term resident with more free movement rights). This confirms Schierup et al.'s (2006) claims of economic citizenship: migrant workers' labour, free movement, residence and settlement rights clearly depend upon their economic utility, at least initially.
Uneven application of utility logics: selecting by skill level
Scarcity might be a crucial guiding principle in foreign worker admissions, but its application is highly uneven across different skill levels and does not always serve as sufficient entry condition. Labour scarcity checks are superfluous for especially well sought after high-skilled professionals; yet, economic utility is not enough in case of relatively restrictive lower skilled admissions. All three countries constitute a legal distinction between high-skilled, skilled and lower skilled/unskilled workers and use it to act upon different imagined parts of the economy. Rather than engaging in a detailed description of what these skill levels mean practically, my point here is that the construal of a skills divide is used in policies to construct different realms for intervention.
Legislation in all three countries treats high-skilled workers most benevolently and offers them advantageous statuses while opening only very limited or no options for others and containing their residence rights much more tightly.
Typically, legislation waives the otherwise obligatory shortage evaluations for a defined circle of 'high-skilled' workers (academics and scientists, blue collars, leading specialists, artists, graduate job seekers, and intra-corporate transfers in multinational companies) and offers more encompassing rights to them. For example, the German Niederlassungserlaubnis (permanent residence permit) has created an immediate settlement pathway, free labour market access and full family reunion rights to high-ranked academics, specialists and blue collars since 2005. Since 2006 a renewable three-year permit for 'skills and talents' entails multi-annual stays and eventual settlement in France.
Specific post-study work routes give domestic graduates free and non-subordinated labour market access (the UK abolished this route in spring 2012). Scientists enjoy facilitated access without RLMT, and governments have moreover designed specific intra-corporate transfer (ICT) routes with similar benefits.
ICT mirror a particularly interesting assumption: they are not treated as migrants per se but as temporary professional movers between the global sites of multinational corporations. They do not count into the annual cap for tier 2 workers in the UK for example, and the usual integration requirements for migrants -sufficient language proficiency etc. -do not apply. At the same time, ICT workers are strictly bound to the condition of temporality: they cannot apply for settlement (France), their permit is strictly fixed-term, and it cannot be renewed from within the country (UK and Germany). In this case, economic utility considerations in support of multinational companies' global labour demands hit the margins of the domestic labour market. If their role as globally moving experts is ruptured by settlement intentions, the preference of domestic labour is reintroduced in the assessment of their legitimate position in the host country's labour market.
The focus on domestic labour supply is starker for skilled and certainly starkest for lower skilled jobs. Migrant employees coming via a shortage route or the RLMT are much more restricted than their high-skilled colleagues. They are tied to one employer and receive fixed term work-residence permits for the exact duration of the work contract. The defined lower skilled realm implies additional checks and exposes a deliberate cut-off of the utilitarian economic demand-and-supply logic, eventually. For example, the German Federal Employment Agency can block admissions of lower skilled workers if the company wanting to recruit is planning domestic redundancies, or if the given labour district suffers from significant above average unemployment. The UK has never activated its tier 3 for lower skilled admissions. Skill level, domestic employment protection, and scarcity assessments hence seem to intersect in the shaping of migrants' entry routes beyond straightforward economic utility assumptions.
Beyond economic rationales: selecting by country of origin 2011b ).
The analysis of legal categorisations revealed that LMP follows economic utility logics with a focus on labour scarcity. This seems unsurprising from a political economy viewpoint and confirms Menz' account of migrant labour's utility in the context of growth and competition strategies. Yet, we do not observe a unitary policy field governed by one guiding principle. The uneven application of the scarcity imperative for admissions of different skill levels alludes to a co-existence of several state projects and highlights respective limits to economic utility and competition state logics. The variation of the scarcity theme -from high-skilled admissive migration regimes to almost exclusive reliance on EU labour in lower skilled jobs -receives analytical attention in the next empirical section. The inquiry in policy-makers' sense-making of versatile admission regimes will help to shed light on the meanings of these regulatory structurations.
Limits of competition state? Three economic imaginaries of labour migration
To make sense of the skills division of labour entry routes and trace associated policy meanings and state projects, this section draws on CPE's analytical concept of economic imaginary. I identify four key elements in the selective arrangement of these imaginaries:
1) skill-level focus, 2) policy rationales (causal focus), 3) spatial focus of recruitment, and 4) emerging dominant modes of recruitment (operational focus). The specific arrangement of these elements is guided by the skills divide: the specific enunciation of causal, spatial and operational focus varies considerably by skill level. The respective privileging of very different economic activities fuels a division of the policy field into three distinct economic imaginaries which selectively accentuate different policy rationales, spatial reference points and modi operandi, and further draw on highly miscellaneous metaphorical language (see synopsis of analysis in table 2):
• Imaginary 1 regulates high-skilled migration in the context of alleged global labour competition,
• Imaginary 2 regulates skilled migration in the context of national labour shortages,
• Imaginary 3 regulates lower skilled admissions in the context of a perceived EU labour self-sufficiency in this realm.
The remainder of the section will substantiate these imaginaries and analyse their meanings and linkages to competition state and Schumpeterian innovation logics. Box 1: Constructing the high-skilled global labour competitiveness imaginary S1: "I do think at a certain level, however, we are a world economy. And in a world economy, that is where we have tiers 1 and partly 2, there are people who circulate around the whole world economy, so that is not so much the skill needs of our particular economy, it is the way our businesses work. We can observe the surfacing of a naturalised economic utility myth in the reference to desirable 'talents' and 'potentials': their huge beneficial impact on the national economy seems to be beyond doubt, and affective language supports the ongoing 'imaginnovation' in a Thriftian manner. To limit recruitment to the national or EU realm is thought to prompt detrimental effects to the competitive position of the domestic business location: "These days, we live and die by our ability to attract inward investment […] [and] if you are an international business you need the ability to bring people in" (UK1; similar statements by GER8 and FRA7).
Rhetorically, this clearly sets labour recruitment in a spatial framework of global or 'world economy' (statement 1) without territorial borders, even though bureaucratic hurdles are certainly also met by 'gold dust' migrants in practice. Operationally, this establishes a need to compete for a highly mobile international labour force without references to the domestic labour market. This construal of high-skilled global mobility and competitiveness feeds into the construction of legal structures that favour high-skilled migrants (previous section). It has even born more global ramifications on European and OECD level demanding more openness towards high-skilled workers, and an increasing number of academics internalise or premise the alleged benefits of liberal high-skilled migration regimes (Cerna 2009 , OECD 2009 , Zaletel 2006 . Their creation of indices to rank countries' openness in that respect announces the emergence of a new subset of the competitiveness 'knowledge brand' (Sum 2009 ).
Imaginary 2: Skilled national labour shortages
The second imaginary focuses on skilled migrant labour. It perceives foreign labour recruitment as a legitimate satisfaction of urging labour demand (causal focus), but also specifies clear limitations to demand-led admissions. Policy experts and documents use terms like 'economic need', 'demand', 'specific shortage' and 'add-on' abundantly to describe the drivers of recruitment in this imaginary and to specify migrant workers' role.
Statements 2 and 3 in box 2 summarise this plainly: migrants fill labour market gaps and satisfy companies 'immediate' needs.
This part of the imagined economy is clearly distinguished from the pursuit of competitiveness and the duties of a competition state. Unlike in the global competitiveness imaginary where high-skilled professionals diversify labour supply and boost innovation, recruitment of 'skilled' foreign workers is not perceived as valuable in itself. Statement 2 alludes to a fine nuance between workers 'who bring a bonus' enabling 'better growth' (high-skilled) and those who fill a shortage (skilled). A UK interviewee metaphorically describes tier 2 shortage applicants as 'cogs in the engine' who are recruited 'for a specific reason' much in contrast to tier 1 high-skilled workers who 'grease the engine' (UK5).
Skilled migrant workers do not carry extra potential of innovation themselves but their very filling of a shortage helps to keep the growth machine going. Have you tried to train domestic workers?" (UK7)
The shortage routes introduced in legislation mirror the 'add-on' logic in their strict orientation towards demand-led selection and specific skills profiles (operational focus).
Temporary permits and entry routes for paid employees are supposed to address short-and mid-term shortages on the respective labour markets. They shape skilled migrant workers' constrained place by fixed-term permits and obligatory links to one employer, their recruitment is contingent on the domestic labour market situation. Policy-makers deem this necessary for similar reasons: foreign workers must not 'ruin French jobs', unemployed
Germans must come first, and British employers must be asked to raise wages or train domestic workers in the longer term (see box 2).
In contrast to the high-skilled global competitiveness imaginary, the protection of the domestic labour market prominently enters the stage in this part of LMP. There is, moreover, a significant temporal focus within this imaginary which departs from competitiveness rationales. Policy-makers argue for a prospective need to train of the domestic workforce and to become less 'reliant' on migrant workers it alludes to a cut-off of the demand-led recruitment approach for lower skilled jobs (skills focus) and emphasises the aim to rely on the domestic and EU workforce to fill these shortages self-sufficiently (operational and spatial focus). This thinking bridges the gap to our third imaginary. The data entail a wide-spread denial of low-skilled labour demand by policy-makers in all three cases, with the exception of seasonal agricultural routes (which are not considered here due to their strict temporal limitation, usually to stays no longer than 6 months at once). S3: "Forget about the bilateral agreements. With the implementation of full free movement, bilateral agreements will vanish, I'd say. Now, it might take a bit longer with Croatia until they are member and enjoy free movement, but it otherwise does not play any role." (GER5)
As statements in box 3 indicate, policy-makers assume that lower skilled labour is in abundant supply on the domestic and European labour market and does therefore not need to be imported from third countries. Several policy-makers make a dual reference to the domestic worker population in this last imaginary: a) as a workforce to be activated in case of unemployment -also with penalising measures if necessary -and b) as a politically susceptible group to be protected from labour market competition with TCN workers. They construe a genuine responsibility of resident workers to respond to lower skilled labour shortages and link activation and employment policy targets to this role interpretation We have come a long way from the admissive high-skilled competitiveness imaginary to almost complete closure towards lower skilled workers from outside the EU.
The analysis of legal classifications in LMP and their normative underpinnings expressed in economic imaginaries exposes contradictions between global competitiveness and economic openness goals on the one hand, and national labour market governance objectives on the other hand. Limits to the state's competitiveness and innovation agenda are clearly visible in policies designed for skilled and lower skilled migrants.
Competitiveness logics contextualise some aspects of LMP, but not others. It is the very division of admission regimes by skill level and the selective contextualisation of the divided policy in different economic imaginaries that seemingly resolves tensions between co-existing state projects.
Divide and rule: Selective use of competition state logics in the political ordering of labour migration
This article has set out to scrutinise the articulation of competition state logics in LMP. The study of legal classifications in France, Germany and the UK exposed a hegemonic discourse of economic utility in labour admissions which serves as necessary entry condition. Labour scarcity is the guiding principle in utilitarian foreign worker admissions, yet its application is highly uneven across different skill levels and is not always accepted as being sufficient. Labour scarcity checks are superfluous for especially well sought after high-skilled professionals, while lower skilled workers have very limited entry options regardless. A CPE analysis exposed that the selective structuration of policies by skill level creates specific roles and scopes for high-skilled, skilled and lower skilled migrants according to the aspects of the economy that legislation selectively highlights and prioritises. The different skill levels targeted, policy drivers, spatial reference points, and modi operandi are arranged into three distinct economic imaginaries of labour migration:
high-skilled global labour competiveness, skilled national labour shortages, and EU lower skilled labour self-sufficiency. We find a dominant logic of easy access for high-skilled migrants in the global competitiveness imaginary, supported by positive metaphorical
connotations. Yet, the logic of global competitiveness and Schumpeterian innovation collapses in the other two imaginaries and is replaced by, or conflated with, competing state projects such as domestic employment protection. 
Limits of competition state theory
Competing state projects and political ordering
Irrespective of potential divergences, the uneven embracement of competition state logics by migrant skill level in Britain, France and Germany alike bears implications for governance theory more generally. LMP amply reflects the contradictions between global competitiveness and economic openness goals on the one hand, and national labour market governance objectives on the other. The tensions between co-existing state projects and narratives in migration policy -economic growth, security and anti-terrorism, social cohesion, domestic welfare, justice and democratic legitimacy -have been described at length (e.g. Boswell et al. 2011 , Carmel et al. 2010 ).
The present CPE analysis has indicated that the product of the multiplicity of state projects is by no means chaotic or anarchic. To the contrary: the selective partitioning of the socio-economic world into three specific economic imaginaries and associated legal classifications in LMP speaks of a powerful construction of 'structured complexity' (Jessop 2009 
Causal focus
Support economic competitiveness and attractiveness of national business location; support innovation and growth; secure fiscal benefits through high earning migrants Secure short-term economic productivity in shortage situations; boost domestic labour supply longer term to prevent reliance on migrants Secure domestic/EU labour supply; lower reliance on migrants; activate domestic unemployed; manage and contain informal labour market
Spatial focus
Globally mobile labour pool and globally operating companies; 'world economy' disembedded from national labour market
Global supply in case of domestic shortages; sometimes in bilateral recruitment only or EU worker preference; embedded in current and prospective national labour market
Reliance on EU and domestic workers to fill shortages; priority of domestic employment and activation policies; ignorance (or 'malign neglect', Samers 2010) towards global informal labour supply
Operational focus
Global supply-led recruitment in competition for 'brightest minds', global 'war' for talent; highly beneficial admission and residence regimes
Selective demand-led recruitment as 'addon' to domestic shortages; fine-tuned identification of shortage and containment of worker in that shortage job; state-led labour market command and control in promotion of domestic up-skilling Exclusivity of EU and domestic supply to fill shortages; activation and 'matching' by state; strictly controlled bilateral agreements with third countries in exceptional cases; fight against informal work and residence
Metaphorical underpinning of imaginary
Discourse of 'talents' and 'high potentials' signifies innovation capacity; 'gold dust' signifies scarce skills and magical quality of some migrants to boost innovation and growth; 'greasing the engine'; rolling out 'red carpet' with beneficial treatment Discourse of 'economic need', 'demand', 'specific shortage' and 'add-on' signifies demand-led focus; concrete space for migrants as 'cogs in the engine' with specific and contained role; discourse on 'reliance' signifies future self-sufficiency aspirations Use of attributes like 'amply' and 'enough' signifies abundance of domestic/EU labour supply; reference to 'duty' and 'obligation' of domestic unemployed to 'pull socks up' ascribes responsive role to them with regard to achieving labour self-sufficiency ii Drawing on comparative capitalist coordination theories I explore the comparative nuances of LMP when being contextualised in different capitalisms elsewhere (Paul 2011a ).
iii Potential socio-political, ethno-cultural or electoral agendas are not captured in this paper. I trace the comparative contextualisation of cross-nationally shared economic imaginaries of labour migration in individual societal environments in the larger project of which this article constitutes but a small part (see Paul 2011a).
iv I draw on category analysis (Yanow 2000) : a mapping of selection mechanisms and associated policy tools in legal documents is used to identify selection principles (i.e. the principles according to which migrant workers are selected and stratified in different access routes) and, ultimately, emerging categories of 'admissible' migrant workers. Interview data then elucidated the meanings of these categories and selection principles and allowed a tracing of underpinning economic imaginaries that selectively assemble these meanings and hold them together.
v The assumption of quasi complete domestic labour market control through state policy within the skilled shortage imaginary is striking. The identification and filling of shortages is presented as a mere technicality; domestic 'upskilling' efforts are conceived as a functional prospect.
This disregards well-researched phenomena like the lack of funding for training (especially in the UK), wage constraints, unattractive working conditions, and the structural reliance on informal labour in some sectors (Morice et al. 2010; Ruhs et al. 2010) .
vi The specific embeddedness within this geography varies, for example France and Germany embraced EU free movement for new accession country nationals more cautiously than the UK and restricted access initially (Paul 2011b ).
